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Uncertainty touches most aspects of life, especially when 
we make decisions that have consequences that we 
cannot predict. Leaving the house without an umbrella 
carries a risk because it could start to rain; investing in the 
stock market carries the risk of losing money. It is 
therefore natural that, whenever we make decisions with 
unpredictable outcomes, we weigh up the possible results 
and their risks and benefits. Of course, some decisions 
carry more severe risks than getting wet or losing money; 
the decision to approve a new drug or to ban certain 
chemicals in products can have far-reaching 
consequences for health, the environment, society and 
economies. In such cases, where the lives of others are 
at stake, decision-making and the handling of 
uncertainties have important ethical dimensions. 
A prudent strategy to deal with this ethical challenge is to 
diminish uncertainty by acquiring knowledge of the issue. 
When it comes to decisions that affect people's lives and 
health – the regulation of potentially harmful substances 
or diagnostic tests to predict an individual's propensity to 
develop a severe disease – carrying out research to 
diminish uncertainty and, consequentially, risks can 
become an ethical duty. If this is not possible – because 
decision-makers cannot wait for the relevant research or 
the gaps in our knowledge are not accessible to scientific 
investigation – the precautionary principle is increasingly 
advocated and used as an alternative strategy to make 
decisions in light of uncertainties. However, the 
application of the precautionary principle itself can create 
dangers [28] that have to be weighed against the benefits 
of adopting it – so-called iatrogenic risks [29] – and 
therefore also has a serious ethical dimension that needs 
to be considered. 
In this viewpoint, we investigate the role of uncertainty in 
the field of practical ethics. This is a relatively new issue 
on the ethical research agenda, which began in the early 
twentieth century when scientists started to evaluate 
economic judgements and decisions from an ethical 
perspective [12,14]. However, the concept of uncertainty 
has been around for a much longer time; starting with 
Socrates and Plato, philosophers doubted whether 
scientific knowledge, no matter how elaborate, sufficiently 
reflected reality [8,10,19]. They realized that the more we 
gain insight into the mysteries of nature, the more we 
become aware of the limits of our knowledge about how 
'things as such' are [8,20]. These limitations to our 
understanding also make it impossible to foresee future 
events or the effects and implications of decisions with 
certainty. 
Any scientist knows that knowledge is never complete 
and that research can do no more than produce estimates 
of what we think is happening. Science, at least in part, is 
not about facts but about odds. Yet accepting and 
realizing this principal uncertainty is a conceptual 
challenge, and it is within this framework that we must 
make decisions of a moral nature. In his book Risk 
Society, Ulrich Beck concludes that "[r]isk calculations are 
the phenotype of the resurrection of ethics [...] in 
economics, natural sciences and technical disciplines" [1]. 
Uncertainty itself has no ethical quality – it is an inherent 
attribute of a situation. However, in a potentially 
dangerous situation, uncertainty can trigger ethically 
adjusted behaviour that aims to avoid dangers and 
diminishes risks. To explain how ethics are relevant to 
uncertainty in such cases, we can draw a schematic map 
of various forms of uncertainty, beginning with a 
distinction between our knowledge and ignorance of the 
probabilities of adverse impacts. 
 
When it comes to decisions that affect 
people's lives and health [...] carrying out 
research to diminish uncertainty and, 
consequentially, risks can become an 
ethical duty 
Our schematic approach, the 'igloo of uncertainty' (Fig.1), 
which was partly inspired by Faber and co-workers [6], 
mainly distinguishes between open and closed forms of 
both ignorance and knowledge. Within that framework, 
dangers are defined in terms of the possible outcomes of 
a given situation. To understand the potential adverse 
effects of a decision, we therefore require an 
approximation of the quality of dangers in any given 
event. Consequently, a rational approach is to give an 
estimate of the probability that the respective event will 
happen, and to assess the hazard and the possible 
impact of the event. Classical risk assessment then takes 
the product of probability and the expected hazard 
dimension to obtain a quantitative measure of risk. 
However, decision-making often depends both on 
mathematical calculations and on moral considerations or 
other convictions, which risk assessment does not 
address. For example, regulations about the use of 
genetically modified crops in agriculture or stem-cell 
research are clearly governed by ethical and societal 
considerations in addition to quantitative risk 
assessments. 
In this regard, it is important to distinguish between 
dangers and risks. A danger has a prescribed quality and 
a defined probability, and can therefore be avoided or 
counteracted. For example, car accidents that caused 
severe or deadly injuries prompted regulation for the 
mandatory installation and use of safety belts. By 
contrast, a risk can either be accepted by, or imposed on, 
a person. Driving without a safety belt is a self-accepted 
risk, while selling cars with faulty safety belts imposes a 
risk on unsuspecting buyers. This is the decisive 
difference between danger and risk: a danger is present 
regardless of choice, whereas a risk is either optionally 
accepted or imposed [13,2]. 
When we know that a certain situation or decision will 
involve dangers and risks, it is a proactive and morally 
justifiable activity to reduce gaps in our knowledge. 
However, although such gaps can be successfully 
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diminished by research, ignorance presents a greater 
challenge. If the cause of ignorance is a lack of 
knowledge, which cannot be reduced owing to stochastics 
and the randomness of the matter under study, and/or the 
structure of our cognitive apparatus, it is called closed 
ignorance or 'nescience' – an absence of knowledge [7]. 
Closed ignorance also results from rejecting or ignoring 
available knowledge, which we refer to as the 'Galileo 
effect' – inspired by the cardinal in Bertolt Brecht's play 
Galileo Galilei, who refused to look through a telescope in 
order not to accept the knowledge that the planets revolve 
around the sun. Not surprisingly, the Galileo effect is itself 
a risk factor and increases danger, although it can be 
overcome. A change in attitude would transform closed 
ignorance into open ignorance, which can, at least in part, 
be addressed by learning or by research. 
 
Science, at least in part, seems to be not 
about facts but about odds 
A prerequisite for turning danger into risk, either by 
accepting it or by being subjected to it, is acquiring 
knowledge about the danger, its nature and its probability. 
In this context, we can distinguish between closed and 
open knowledge with respect to risk – analogous to 
closed and open ignorance with respect to danger. In this 
case, closed knowledge means comprehensive 
knowledge or the certainty that the adverse event will 
happen in any case. For example, driving at 200 km/h 
without a safety belt generally means death in an 
accident. Under these circumstances, the most 
responsible and rational behaviour would be either to use 
a safety belt or to avoid the situation altogether. 
Open knowledge, by contrast, means that there is 
sufficient information available to perform a risk 
assessment, and to give rational and responsible advice, 
such as requiring people to wear safety belts and 
imposing speed limits. However, a notable amount of 
ignorance remains that clearly distinguishes a 'risky' 
situation from a non-risky one (Fig.1). 
An ethically responsible strategy to address gaps in 
knowledge and, therefore, uncertainties about possible 
outcomes requires insight into the particular type of 
uncertainty. We therefore propose a 'taxonomy of 
uncertainty' that recognizes two fundamental forms of 
uncertainty, both of which are divided into two further sub-
forms (Fig.2). Each of the sub-forms describes a 
particular type of mismatch between the knowledge 
required and the knowledge available for rational 
decision-making. 
The first form of uncertainty in this scheme is objective 
uncertainty, which can be further divided into 
epistemological uncertainty and ontological uncertainty 
[25]. The former is caused by gaps in knowledge that can 
be closed by research. In this case, research becomes a 
moral duty that is required to avoid dangers or risks, to 
realize possible benefits, or to balance risks and benefits 
in a rational and responsible way. Still, given the need to 
make a decision at some point, decision-makers must 
both rely on existing knowledge and reflect on any 
remaining uncertainties. One strategy in this regard is a 
comparative risk assessment of similar situations. For 
example, the assessment of the health or environmental 
risks of a new chemical could draw on both existing 
knowledge about related compounds and information 
from safety tests. 
Conversely, ontological uncertainty is caused by the 
stochastic features of a situation, which will usually 
involve complex technical, biological and/or social 
systems. Such complex systems are often characterized 
by nonlinear behaviour, which makes it impossible to 
resolve uncertainties by deterministic reasoning and/or 
research [22]. In such cases, it is impossible to make 
rational decisions and we therefore call such decisions 
'quasi-rational'. The effects of interfering with financial 
markets or ecosystems, for example, are largely 
unpredictable; nevertheless, past experience and 
probabilistic reasoning at least provide some guidance on 
how such complex systems will react. 
The second main form of uncertainty in our taxonomy is 
subjective uncertainty, which is characterized by an 
inability to apply appropriate moral rules. These types of 
uncertainty can lead to societal anxiety or conflict, which 
Emile Durkheim called 'anomie' ([4]; originally published in 
1893). Yet, even within a state of anomie, decisions have 
to be made. Again, we can distinguish between two sub-
forms of subjective uncertainty. The first is uncertainty 
with respect to rule-guided decisions. This is caused by a 
lack of applicable moral rules and we call these situations 
'moral uncertainties'. In this case, decision-makers have to 
fall back on more general moral rules and use them to 
deduce guidance for the special situation in question. 
Examples of these types of general rule are Immanuel 
Kant's moral imperative [9] or the Hippocratic Oath taken 
by doctors. Unfortunately, deductions guided by general 
moral rules often give only poor satisfaction to the 
decision-maker. 
 
A prerequisite for turning danger into risk, 
either by accepting it or by being subjected 
to it, is acquiring knowledge about the 
danger... 
The second sub-form is uncertainty with respect to 
intuition-guided decisions—that is, uncertainty in moral 
rules. In specific situations, we can make decisions only 
by relying on our intuition rather than knowledge, or 
explicit or implicit moral rules. This means that we act on 
the basis of fundamental pre-formed moral convictions in 
addition to experiential and internalized moral models. As 
with rule-guided decisions, a level of deduction is used 
here, but in a subconscious and intuitive way. We call the 
decisions that stem from internalized experiences and 
moral values 'intuitional'. 
The way that the scientific method deals with knowledge 
and ignorance, according to the schematic view shown in 
Fig.1, creates practical ethical problems with regard to 
making decisions in the face of uncertainty. Much of the 
research in the fields of chemistry, biology and medicine 
assesses the effects of a certain agent – be it a potentially 
hazardous substance, a new pharmaceutical or a medical 
therapy – on humans, animals and the environment. This 
is usually done in a defined but ultimately limited study, 
the results of which are extrapolated to the general 
population. To assess whether the observed effects are 
'real' or just random variations, researchers perform a 
statistical test for significance that is based on the 
concurrence of both a null hypothesis (that there is no 
effect) and an alternative hypothesis (that there is an 
effect; [15]). Although this procedure is strongly formalized 
and based on mathematical calculations, it still carries the 
risk of rejecting a true hypothesis out of ignorance – if 
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uncertainties cannot be eliminated or if possible 
knowledge is rejected (Fig.1). This might have dire 
consequences in either case. A 'false positive', for 
instance, rejecting a safe drug application, might have 
serious consequences if it is a potentially life-saving 
medication. Similarly, a 'false negative' – wrongly 
rejecting the null hypothesis – could create severe 
dangers for human and environmental health in the case 
of a hazardous chemical. 
This is where the precautionary principle is applied as a 
strategy to prevent incalculable possible dangers. As an 
epistemic principle, the precautionary principle deals with 
uncertainties in a proactive fashion [17]. It is therefore 
distinct from quantitative risk assessment, which requires 
at least open knowledge (Fig.1) to calculate the 
probabilities of possible adverse effects. Several 
international proceedings, such as the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), the 
Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) 
and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (2001), therefore regard the precautionary 
principle as an approach to prevent harm where risk 
analyses cannot be performed: "Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation" [24]. 
 
...deductions guided by general moral rules 
often give only poor satisfaction to the 
decision-maker 
The precautionary principle can help us to cope with open 
ignorance (Fig.1). However, research has shown that 
precautionary measures can have negative side effects 
because they might lower public trust by amplifying unreal 
public risk perceptions [28]. Therefore, in a state of 
uncertainty, the application of precautionary measures 
has to be carefully weighed against other outcomes, 
especially spurious anxieties and fears, and a principal 
scepticism towards technological innovations. It is 
therefore important to keep in mind that the precautionary 
principle does not [21], and should not [18], constitute a 
decision rule – it is instead a 'state of mind' [21] that helps 
decision-makers to avoid false negatives, and to be more 
sensitive to uncertainties, ambiguities and ignorance [23]. 
In regulatory practice, the implementation of the 
precautionary principle is often problematic because of 
the discrepancy between the promise of scientific 
knowledge and the lack thereof in a specific case. This 
problem was termed the 'uncertainty paradox' [26] and 
refers to the adoption of precautionary action in the light 
of insufficient scientific evidence with the concomitant 
request for scientific knowledge. As the precautionary 
principle is designed to deal with uncertainty, its 
application demonstrates the limits of science to provide 
reliable evidence of potential risks. Yet, whenever 
precautionary action is established, science is called on to 
deliver knowledge in order to assess potential risks [27]. 
The new European chemical regulations highlight the 
practical relevance of the uncertainty paradox. In 2007, 
the European Union Regulatory Framework for the 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals 
(REACH) went into effect. It covers about 100,000 
chemicals, of which 141 high-volume chemicals have so 
far been identified as priority substances for risk 
assessment. The aim of REACH is to improve the 
protection of human health and the environment through 
better and earlier identification of the potentially 
hazardous properties of chemical substances. Both 
manufacturers and importers are required to undertake 
risk assessments of the substances that they produce and 
use, rather than the public authorities that had previously 
been obliged to do so. 
REACH is an example of precautionary action to 
decrease potential unknown negative effects. At the same 
time, the regulatory framework is an example of the 
uncertainty paradox, because there is a discrepancy 
between precautions taken to deal with uncertainties and 
the demand for more risk analysis of the respective 
chemicals. For instance, chemicals that must be 
authorized are substances "identified by scientific 
evidence as causing probable serious effects to humans 
or the environment" [5]. It is debatable whether it is 
possible to achieve zero risk for about 100,000 chemicals 
that are in use in many conceivable combinations. This 
question belongs to the ethics of uncertainty insofar as the 
precautionary paradox might be enforced intentionally to 
suggest that there are 'risks' (that is, open knowledge; 
Fig.1), although the respective cases are still 'dangers' 
(that is, open ignorance). 
The precautionary principle and the uncertainty paradox 
share common ground with the so-called Collingridge 
Dilemma [3]. This is "a methodological quandary in which 
efforts to control technology development face a double-
bind problem: (1) an information problem: impacts cannot 
be easily predicted until the technology is extensively 
developed and widely used, and (2) a power problem: 
control or change is difficult when the technology has 
become entrenched" [3]. 
REACH is also an example of the Collingridge Dilemma 
because it assumes the worst-case scenario until science 
proves otherwise. At the same time, it has to denounce 
worst-case scenarios because it is not possible to ban all 
substances, many of which have been used for decades 
or are ubiquitous in the environment. One approach to 
resolve this dilemma is to give an expected value of 
deleteriousness or recommend threshold concentrations. 
Many regulations for chemical usage apply so-called 
maximum workplace concentration values, which define 
the maximum value of exposure that is assumed to be 
harmless. This is especially problematic in the case of 
carcinogens, because one single molecule might be 
sufficient to cause cancer. 
In addition to addressing uncertainties in both the theory 
and practical implementation of the precautionary 
principle, there are cases in which adverse effects can be 
scientifically predicted with high probability or even 
absolute certainty. However, in these cases, people can 
deliberately reject knowledge and choose to remain 
ignorant of the dangers – this is the Galileo effect 
mentioned previously (Fig.1). A current example of this is 
the use of genetic testing to predict Huntington disease 
(HD), which is a rare inheritable neurological disorder 
affecting around eight people in every 100,000. HD results 
from a genetically programmed degeneration of cells in 
certain areas of the brain. The disease allele is dominant, 
which means that a child who has one parent with HD has 
a 50% chance of inheriting the gene and inevitably 
developing – and dying from – HD. There is at present no 
cure and no way to alter the course of HD. Life 
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expectancy is generally between 10 and 25 years after 
the onset of obvious symptoms. Because the HD gene 
has been identified, it is possible to test whether 
individuals who are at risk carry the deleterious allele. 
It is difficult to decide whether to take this test. Some 
choose not to for numerous reasons, including the 
oppressive and emotional consequences of a positive 
result. This is justified both by the right to informational 
self-determination and the right to privacy. However, HD 
not only affects the individual, but also leads to behaviour 
that can threaten the health of others – for example, a 
higher risk of traffic accidents because of the 
neuromuscular disturbances that are a common 
symptom. On a side note, health insurance companies 
also claim that they have the right to know about a client's 
health status. 
 
Uncertainties challenge the central claim of 
science: that all problems are presumed to 
be solvable by research 
The individual consequences of knowing therefore 
support a comprehensive right not-to-know; however, 
society seems to have an opposing legitimate interest to 
know about the special medical, financial and social 
needs of HD-affected persons, according to a functionalist 
perspective [16]. Any advice based on ethical convictions 
about genetic testing for HD therefore has to weigh up the 
rights of the individual to self-determination and privacy, 
the duty of parents to care for a potentially HD-affected 
child, and the need for society to optimize medical 
treatment and minimize the costs of care for affected 
persons. A morally justified decision therefore requires a 
toolkit of ethical considerations that are able to handle 
certainties in such a case. 
Uncertainties challenge the central claim of science: that 
all problems are presumed to be solvable by research. 
Many social, health and environmental issues, however, 
have been shown to be so complex that it might never be 
possible to make reliable predictions about the effects of 
manipulating these systems. 
This viewpoint is intended to highlight some important 
ethical considerations about the limitations of knowledge 
in the assessment of human health risks. Clearly, acting 
in a state of uncertainty can create ethical problems: 
ignorance caused by rejection of knowledge can lead to 
danger. However, knowledge can also lead to ethical 
problems: it can create risks if the exposed person 
decides to accept the threat, imposes it on another 
person or accepts that such a threat is imposed. 
As we have shown, uncertainties about adverse effects 
can be categorized in a taxonomy of uncertainty (Fig.2). 
In some situations, these uncertainties might warrant the 
implementation of the precautionary principle. However, a 
responsible application of the precautionary principle in a 
state of uncertainty has to be considered carefully and 
specifically in every case with respect to all possible 
outcomes. 
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Fig.1: The igloo of uncertainty.
 
 
 
Fig.2: The taxonomy of uncerteinties and decisions. 
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